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Abstract:
We analyze di¤erent alternatives how a common unemployment insurance system for
the euro area (EA) could be designed and assess their e¤ectiveness to act as an insurance
device in the presence of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. Running counterfactual
simulations based on micro data for the period 2000-13, we highlight and quantify
the trade-o¤ between automatic stabilization e¤ects and the degree of cross-country
transfers. In the baseline, we focus on a non-contingent scheme covering short-term
unemployment and nd that it would have absorbed a signicant fraction of the un-
employment shock in the recent crisis. However, 5 member states of the EA18 would
have been either a permanent net contributor or net recipient. Our results suggest that
claw-back mechanisms and contingent benets could limit the degree of cross-country
redistribution, but might reduce desired insurance e¤ects. We also discuss moral haz-
ard issues at the level of individuals, the administration and economic policy.
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession and the resulting European debt crisis have revived the debate
about deeper scal integration in the European Monetary Union (EMU). The EMU
is an atypical monetary union because monetary policy is decided at the central (Eu-
ropean) level while scal policy is carried out at the sub-central (member-state) level
(Bordo et al. 2013).1 Some observers argue that national automatic stabilizers provided
insu¢ cient income insurance during the crisis as some EMU member states lost access
to private capital markets and conclude that common scal stabilization mechanisms
are necessary to make EMU more sustainable (Bertola 2013, IMF 2013). While the
main argument in favor of integrated scal mechanisms in the euro area is that they
should act as insurance devices in the presence of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks,
the main concerns in the debate relate to the issues of permanent transfer ows within
the currency union and moral hazard, in particular with regard to negative incentive
e¤ects inducing national governments to neglect structural reforms or scal consolida-
tion.
How could a scal risk sharing mechanism in the euro area be designed? The former
President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, has suggested the following:
An EMU scal capacity with a limited asymmetric shock absorption function could
take the form of an insurance-type system between euro area countries. [...] The spe-
cic design of such a function could follow two broad approaches. The rst would be
a macroeconomic approach, where contributions and disbursements would be based on
uctuations in cyclical revenue and expenditure items [...]. The second could be based
on a microeconomic approach, and be more directly linked to a specic public func-
tion sensitive to the economic cycle, such as unemployment insurance.(Van Rompuy
2012). The European Commission built upon this initiative when launching its o¢ cial
report entitled A blueprint for a deep and genuine Economic and Monetary Union -
Launching a European Debate(European Commission 2012).
Since then, the perspectives of a European scal union and di¤erent reform propos-
als along the lines of the Van Rompuy report have been analyzed in various studies.2
For the macroeconomic approachsuggestions include a cyclical shock absorber based
1In the following we equivalently use EA, EMUand Eurozone to refer to the current 18
member states of the European Currency Union and thus, only to those EMU members who have
already introduced the euro.
2First analyses of potential insurance e¤ects if the EMU were more scally integrated date back
to the introduction of the euro (Fatás 1998 and Forni and Reichlin 1999), adding to the vast literature
on insurance e¤ects in existing scal federations such as the US (see e.g. Bayoumi and Masson 1995
and Asdrubali et al. 1996). More recent contributions include Bargain et al. (2013) who analyze the
economic implications of a fully integrated European tax and transfer system and a scal equalization
mechanism based on taxing capacity and expenditure needs for 11 founding members of the euro
area, and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2013) who ask to what extent economic shocks would be absorbed
by the center if the EU were as scally integrated as the US. The question of how to optimally design
insurance mechanisms and the political economy of scal unions has also gained renewed interest in
the more theoretical literature (cf. Evers 2012, Farhi and Werning 2014, Luque et al. 2014).
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on output-gaps (Enderlein et al. 2013) and a stabilization fund for the euro area (Furceri
and Zdzienicka 2013). For the microeconomic approach, the discussion has focused on
the idea of a common EMU-wide unemployment insurance system (henceforth EMU-
UI) as proposed among others by Deinzer (2004), Dullien (2014a) and Andor (2014).3
Previous studies on the economic e¤ects of an EMU-UI system are based on aggregate
macro-level data and focus on overall net contributions across euro area member states.
This is the rst paper based on household micro data that provides a comprehensive
and systematic analysis of a wide range of design options for an EMU-UI system.4
Our counterfactual simulation experiment includes the EA18 member states and cov-
ers the whole period since the start of the euro in 1999. Besides net contributions per
member state, our analysis includes coverage ratios and automatic scal stabilization
e¤ects of a basic EMU-UI scheme that (partly) replaces national unemployment insur-
ance systems. In addition, we explore the e¤ects of experience rating and claw-back
mechanisms that are supposed to limit the amount of redistribution across member
states. We also compare the basic EMU-UI scheme to a variant with contingent, i.e.,
trigger-based benet payments that provide income insurance only if the labor market
situation deteriorates signicantly in a given member state. Moreover, we run several
sensitivity checks regarding coverage and generosity levels of the scheme. We also dis-
cuss various concerns and potential adverse e¤ects of an EMU-UI system, in particular
the view that such a system would lead to a transfer union in Europe and moral hazard
issues. Importantly, the aim of the paper is not to serve as a policy proposal but rather
as a conceptual experiment, providing general insights in the e¤ects of various design
options for a basic EMU-UI.
Our main results are as follows. We nd that a basic euro area unemployment
insurance scheme with a replacement rate of 50 per cent, a maximum duration of ben-
et receipt of 12 months and a broad coverage of all new unemployed with previous
employment income could be implemented with a relatively small annual budget. Over
the period 2000-13, average benets would have amounted to roughly 49 billion euro
per year nanced by a uniform contribution rate across member states of 1.57 per cent
on employment income. While the scheme does not lead to permanent redistribution
per se as only short-term (rather than structural) unemployment is insured at the
central level, our simulations show that a small number of member states would have
3See also IAB (2013), Centre for European Policy Studies (2014), Dullien et al. (2014) and Lellouch
and Sode (2014). Claeys et al. (2014) provide an overview of policy challenges associated with an
EMU-UI system.
4Jara and Sutherland (2014) also use micro data to analyze to what extent an EMU-unemployment
insurance system would top-up national unemployment insurance systems in 10 euro area member
states to guarantee a minimum level of income protection. Their analysis is conceptually di¤erent
from ours as they compare stabilization gaps of existing national systems which would be lled by
the centralized unemployment insurance scheme while we focus on the economic e¤ects of the lat-
ter ignoring potential top-ups of national unemployment insurance systems. Both studies are thus
complementary to each other.
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been net contributor or net recipient in each year of our simulation period. Largest
net contributors are Austria, Germany and the Netherlands with average yearly net
contributions of 0.2-0.42 per cent of GDP, while Latvia and Spain are the largest net
recipients (average yearly net benets of 0.33 and 0.53 per cent of GDP). We nd that
household incomes would have been stabilized in particular at the beginning of the re-
cent economic crisis. Our measure for automatic stabilization, the income stabilization
coe¢ cient, indicates that 36 per cent of the unemployment shock in 2009, measured as
the decline in income due to the surge in unemployment, would have been absorbed
by the scheme in the Eurozone. However, this e¤ect would have diminished the longer
the crisis lasted as the share of (non-eligible) long-term unemployed was rising in the
majority of member states. Schemes with lower coverage ratios and generosity lev-
els generate smaller cross-country transfers, but also reduce desired insurance e¤ects.
Country-specic contribution rates that would have balanced the budget in each mem-
ber state over the period 2000-13 range from 0.75 per cent in the Netherlands to 3.3
per cent in Spain. The spread becomes larger if budgets are required to be balanced in
each single year and range from 0.46 per cent in Luxembourg to 5.8 per cent in Latvia.
However, revenue-neutrality can be imposed only ex-post when accumulated net benet
payments and changes in the tax base are known. Therefore, we explore to what extent
cross-country transfers can be restricted ex-ante by pre-specied rules and analyze two
di¤erent claw-back mechanisms, i.e., ex-post adjustments of country-specic contribu-
tion rates. We nd that they would have led to smaller accumulated surpluses/decits
relative to the benchmark of a uniform and time-invariant contribution rate in some,
but not in all member states. Finally, we consider a contingent benet scheme which
is activated if the unemployment rate in a given member state is 1 percentage point
higher than in one of the previous three years. Under this system no member state
would have been in a permanent net contributing / receiving position. With 21 billion
euro per year, the overall budget and thus the amount of cross-country redistribution
would have been less than half as large as under the non-contingent scheme in the
baseline.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss di¤erent alternatives
how a common EMU-UI system could be designed. In addition, we present key features
of the simulated EMU-UI schemes. Section 3 describes the framework of the analysis.
Baseline results are presented in section 4. Alternative EMU-UI schemes with claw-
back mechanisms based on experience rating and contingent benets are analyzed in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Possible characteristics of an EMU-UI system
Design options. A common unemployment insurance system for the euro area could
be designed in various ways. Three key options have been discussed in the literature
and in the policy debate so far. A rst option would be a common EMU-UI system
that provides a basic level of insurance by partly replacing national unemployment
insurance systems. Benets from the euro area system could be topped up by addi-
tional payments from national unemployment insurance systems. Hence, there would
be room for diversity across member states so that existing di¤erences with regard to
replacement rates and benet duration could be preserved. The EMU-UI system would
be nanced by social insurance contributions with a contribution rate that could be
uniform across Eurozone member states or country-specic and time-variant to restrict
cross-country transfers.5 An important feature of such a scheme is that it would provide
income insurance to the unemployed (under certain eligibility conditions) irrespective
of the size of the unemployment shock in a given member state. As an alternative, a
common scheme could provide income stabilization only in the event of large (unem-
ployment) shocks. Such contingent unemployment benets would be triggered if the
level and/or change in overall unemployment has reached a pre-determined threshold
in a given period.6 National unemployment insurance systems would still be in place in
normal times. As a third option, the euro area unemployment insurance scheme could
complement national systems by providing additional transfers which would either top
up national benets or kick-in if national benets expire. The payout rules of this
scheme could be trigger-based as well. Such a system would be comparable to the US
unemployment insurance system where regular state benets can be complemented by
two types of benets extension programs which are at least partly provided by the
federal government, the Extended Benet program (EB) and emergency benets.7
Concerns. A major concern with an EMU-UI system is that it would lead to
permanent transfers across euro area member states. How do the three variants for an
EMU-UI system di¤er with regard to the risk of permanent redistribution? A basic
EMU-UI scheme would not lead to permanent redistribution per se given that such
a scheme conditions on changes in employment status rather than on unemployment
levels. Di¤erences in unemployment rates alone do not (necessarily) lead to permanent
redistribution because benets would be targeted to cyclical (short-time) unemploy-
5Cf. Dolls et al. (2014) and Dullien (2014b).
6Cf. Epaulard (2014) and Gros (2014). Other triggers could be the short-term unemployment rate
or the insured unemployment rate which is used in the US unemployment insurance system (besides
the total unemployment rate) as a trigger for benet extension programs (Nicholson et al. 2014).
7Cf. Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2012) and Nicholson et al. (2014). Note that in the US regular
state benets are paid for a period which usually lasts not longer than 6 months. The large extensions
of unemployment insurance provided by the US federal government in the 2009-12 period increased
the benet duration to 99 weeks in many US states. Unemployment benets in the EMU are usually
granted much longer than regular state benets in the US (Esser et al. 2013).
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ment and expire after a certain time span. It may nevertheless happen that (net)
transfers are unevenly distributed across member states if ows into unemployment
diverge permanently or if there are permanent di¤erences in the level of short-term
unemployment.8 This risk could be reduced by claw-back mechanisms based on expe-
rience rating or if transfers were trigger-based as under the contingent benet scheme.
Clearly, redistributive e¤ects of the former (latter) scheme would depend on the exact
claw-back mechanism (choice of the trigger). The risk of permanent transfers would be
high with an EMU-UI scheme that provides extended benets after national unemploy-
ment benets expire because such a scheme would be likely to cover not only cyclical,
but also structural unemployment. Moreover, it could incentivize governments to cut
national unemployment insurance benets as the EMU-UI system would step in.
A further concern related to moral hazard is that a common EMU-UI system could
undermine incentives for national governments to address structural weaknesses of the
labor market. One argument against this claim is that national governments would still
bear the cost of long-term unemployment under a basic, contingent or non-contingent
EMU-UI system. This argument is much weaker, however, with an extended benet
program which is likely to cover also structural unemployment. Moreover, incentives to
pursue active labor market policies such as short-time work could be adversely a¤ected
by an EMU-UI system given that the cost of short-term unemployment would be borne
by the common pool.
Additional concerns relate to other moral hazard issues including administrative
manipulation and adverse incentive e¤ects at the individual level with regard to job
search and labor supply. National administrations would have incentives to use their
discretion to increase the number of benet recipients. Incentives to manipulate would
depend on the characteristics of the system, e.g. the required employment period or
a waiting period for EMU-UI benets. The longer both periods are, the more costly
would administrative manipulation be, but longer periods would also reduce desired
insurance e¤ects. Distortions at the individual level depend on the overall benet level
(EMU plus national benets) relative to the status quo and in case of the extended
benet scheme also on the benet duration. The e¤ect of a common EMU-UI system
on migration responses in case of unemployment is ambiguous. The portability of
unemployment benet claims might increase the willingness to migrate and to search
for a job in a member state with better labor market conditions, but could potentially
also reduce incentives for active job search if EMU-UI benes are more generous than
national benets.
Key features of the simulated EMU-UI schemes. The current debate focuses
on a basic EMU-UI system (contingent and non-contingent) as the risk of permanent
transfers and moral hazard issues are perceived to be less severe compared to an ex-
8Economies where seasonal employment like in tourism plays an important role would be likely to
have larger ows into and out of unemployment.
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tended benet system. In the baseline scenario, we therefore focus on a basic, non-
contingent EMU-UI scheme with a replacement rate of 50 per cent of previous gross
earnings and a broad coverage of the short-term unemployed.9 Eligible to EMU-UI
benets are all newly unemployed with previous employment income for a period of
up to 12 months. The scheme is nanced by social insurance contributions with a
uniform contribution rate across member states and calibrated to be revenue-neutral
at the Eurozone-level (but not the member-state level) over the simulation period.
This scheme is labeled as variant A henceforth. In addition, we explore how our results
change if we vary some key parameters of the baseline scheme in terms of coverage rates
and generosity levels. With regard to the former, we introduce a waiting period of 2
months after job loss before eligibility to EMU-UI benets begins in order to diminish
the e¤ect of seasonal unemployment (variant B). Moreover, while the coverage rate
of the newly unemployed is assumed to be 100 per cent in the baseline (upper bound
estimate)10, we assume as a lower bound estimate that only the share of short-term un-
employed covered by national unemployment insurance systems receives benets from
the euro area scheme (variant C). Variants B and C are otherwise identical to variant
A, i.e., the replacement rate is 50 per cent of previous gross earnings and benets are
only paid up to the 12th month after job loss. In terms of generosity, we consider a
scheme with a maximum benet amount of 50 per cent of median gross income in a
member state (variant D), a replacement rate of 35 per cent of gross earnings (variant
E)11, and a scheme where variants D and E are combined (variant F). Note that in
variants D-F, the coverage rules of variant A are applied. Additionally, we compare the
baseline EMU-UI scheme (variant A) to three alternative variants in which we impose
revenue-neutrality at the member-state level (experience rating), adjust contribution
rates based on past net balances in each member-state (claw-back mechanisms) and
make the basic EMU-UI scheme trigger-based (contingent benets). The analysis of
redistributive and stabilizing properties of these additional variants is an important
extension to the previous literature because they are often assumed to alleviate the
risk of permanent redistribution and moral hazard issues.
9This is on average equivalent to a replacement rate of 71 per cent of net income. To be precise, it
corresponds to a replacement rate of 71.4 per cent applied to 70 per cent of gross income, i.e., taking
into account the average share of income taxes and social insurance contributions in the euro area. A
key advantage of applying the replacement rate to gross rather than net earnings is that in the former
case the generosity of the scheme is not a¤ected by the size (and progressivity) of national net taxes
(income taxes, social insurance contributions and cash benets) which vary considerably across euro
area member states.
10Note that the total coverage rate is below 100 per cent as only short-term unemployed are covered
by the EMU-UI scheme.
11This is on average equivalent to a replacement rate of 50 per cent of net income.
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3 Data and methodology
3.1 EU-SILC and EUROMOD
Di¤erent methodological approaches for an analysis of the economic e¤ects of an EMU-
UI system are possible. While previous research has mainly used aggregate macro level
data, we rely on representative household micro data for the EA18 and use EURO-
MOD, a static tax-benet calculator for the European Union countries, for counter-
factual simulations. The key advantage of using a micro data approach in the present
context is that it enables us to account for heterogeneity in various characteristics of
the populations in di¤erent countries which macro data approaches cannot capture.
EUROMOD input-data are mainly based on the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) released by Eurostat (Eurostat 2012). The sim-
ulated components include most direct taxes (especially income taxes on all sources
of income including tax credits, payroll taxes and social insurance contributions) and
benets (e.g. welfare benets, social assistance and some transfers based on previous
contributions, e.g. unemployment benets).12
3.2 Simulation experiment
An important feature of EUROMOD is that it allows for counterfactual ex-ante sim-
ulations. In our empirical analysis, we introduce an unemployment insurance scheme
for the current 18 member states of the euro area and ask what would have happened
if such a scheme had been introduced from the start of the euro in 1999.13 In a rst
step, we reweight our base year household micro data from 2008 such that labor mar-
ket conditions (unemployment rate, earnings and size of labor force) correspond to
the levels observed in the starting year of our simulation period.14 In the next step,
we simulate a sample of repeated cross-sections for each euro area member state for
the period 2000-13 by reweighting our cross-country micro data such that total unem-
ployment, short-term unemployment, earnings and the size of the labor force follow
observed trends in each member state during the simulation period.15 An increase (a
12Sutherland and Figari (2013) provide more detailed information on EUROMOD and the under-
lying input data.
13We assume that the current EA18 would have existed from 1999 onwards. In fact, it would
complicate the interpretation of our results if we included new member states only after adoption of
the euro.
14Note that EUROMOD is based on cross-sectional data and not panel data. The rst data year
available in the current version is 2008. Hence, we need to reweight the data (as commonly done in
microsimulation studies) using macro aggregates to reect the potentially changing structure of the
economy during the simulation period. This allows us to construct a series of reweighted cross-sections
for the period of analysis.
15Earnings growth along the intensive margin and changes in the size of the labor force are mod-
eled in order to account for changes in the tax base of the euro area unemployment insurance system.
Growth rates in nominal compensation per employee, unemployment rates and the size of the la-
bor force are obtained from the AMECO database, information on short-term unemployment from
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decrease) of the unemployment rate is modeled by increasing the weights of the un-
employed (employed) while the weights of the employed (unemployed) are decreased
correspondingly, i.e., in e¤ect a fraction of employed (unemployed) households is made
unemployed (employed).16
Our analysis is based on the following simplifying assumptions. First, we do not take
into account general equilibrium e¤ects of an EMU-UI system, i.e., our analysis remains
in a partial equilibrium context. This implies that we abstract both from potential
moral hazard of national governments and administrations which could have adverse
labor market e¤ects as well as from potential growth-enhancing e¤ects of an EMU-UI
scheme. Accounting for these macroeconomic feedback e¤ects would require to link
our micro data to a macro-econometric simulation model. However, past validations of
micro-macro linkages point to a considerable degree of uncertainty of macroeconomic
projections (Peichl 2009). Second, we do not simulate individual behavioral responses,
e.g. potential migration responses, changes in hours worked or di¤erent patterns of
entries and exits to the labor force which could follow the introduction of an EMU-
UI.17 In the light of these assumptions, our results should be interpreted as rst-round
e¤ects of an EMU-UI system.
4 Main results
4.1 Coverage rates
Before analyzing coverage rates of various EMU-UI schemes, we rst provide descriptive
statistics on the unemployment rates of EMUmember states. Figure 1 shows that there
are signicant di¤erences in both levels and trends in unemployment rates and the
share of short-term unemployed for the period 2000-13 across euro area member states.
Di¤erences between Germany on the one hand and Greece, Ireland and Spain on the
other hand are particularly remarkable. In Germany, the unemployment rate increased
from 2001 onwards, peaked at 11.3 per cent in 2005 being the second highest rate in the
euro area in that year, but constantly fell afterwards. Contrary, unemployment rates
increased tremendously in Greece, Ireland and Spain from 2008/2009 onwards, up to
14.7 per cent in Ireland in 2012 and 26.4 (27.3) per cent in Spain (Greece) in 2013.
Other member states such as Cyprus, Estonia, Italy and Portugal were also hit by
Eurostat.
16See Immvervoll et al. (2006), Bargain et al. (2012) and Dolls et al. (2012) for similar applications
of the reweighting approach. When modeling (un)employment shocks, the new (un)employed are
evenly chosen from the full cross-section. An alternative approach would be to assume that the socio-
demographic characteristics of the (un)employed remain constant which seems less realistic given the
length of our simulation period.
17Bargain et al. (2013) account for labor supply behavior after the introduction of a European tax
and transfer system. They nd that labor supply responses are marginal and do not alter their main
results.
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large unemployment shocks during the crisis. This would have led to increasing shares
of benet recipients of the euro area scheme relative to the labor force, in particular in
those member states most a¤ected by rising unemployment rates. However, the share
of short-term unemployed (relative to total unemployment) was falling the longer the
crisis lasted. Hence, coverage rates of the baseline EMU-UI scheme (which are equal
to the share of short-term unemployed) would have declined as well in spite of rising
unemployment rates in recent years.
Figure 2 summarizes average coverage rates of EMU-UI over the period 2000-13 for
the baseline scenario of full coverage of all new unemployed (variant A), a scenario with
a waiting period of 2 months at the beginning of the unemployment spell (variant B)
and a scheme covering only the share of short-term unemployed which receives national
unemployment insurance benets (variant C).18 Figure 2 shows that di¤erences in
average coverage rates are substantial ranging from 34 per cent in Slovakia to 78 per
cent in Finland in the baseline. A waiting period would to some extent exclude seasonal
unemployment (like in tourism) from coverage. Our results indicate that coverage rates
would indeed decline signicantly as a considerable fraction of unemployment spells in
euro area member states lasts for not more than 2 months. Finally, coverage rates are
much lower than in the baseline if we apply national coverage rates of the short-term
unemployed. Lowest coverage rates of roughly 10 per cent are found for Greece, Italy
and Slovakia, whereas more than 40 (50) per cent of the short-term unemployed are
covered by national unemployment insurance systems in Austria (Finland).
Figure 1: (Short-time) unemployment and coverage EMU-UI
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18Information about the share of unemployed whose unemployment spell does not exceed 2 months
(waiting period) and the share of unemployed receiving national unemployment insurance benets is
obtained from Eurostat. Coverage rates for each year of our simulation period are shown in Table 2
in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Average coverage rates 2000-13
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Note: Baseline: all new unemployed with previous employment income covered (variant A).
Waiting period: no benets paid in the rst 2 months of the unemployment spell (variant
B). National coverage: only the share of short-term unemployed covered by national
unemployment insurance systems eligible to benets from euro area scheme (variant C).
Sources: EUROSTAT and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
4.2 Budgetary e¤ects and nancial ows
For the baseline scheme (variant A), a uniform contribution rate across member states
of 1.57 per cent on employment income would have led to revenue-neutrality at the euro
area level over the period 2000-13.19 Note that the scheme can run decits and surpluses
in single years which has important implications for its automatic stabilization e¤ects
as discussed in the next section. Figure 3 shows the evolution of contributions and
benets for the EA18. While contributions would have almost constantly grown over
the period due to growth in nominal earnings, benet payments would have uctuated
to a much larger extent. On average, benets and contributions amount to 49 billion
euro per year. The scheme would have run surpluses from 2000-03 and from 2006-
08 and decits in the remaining years, in particular during the recent nancial and
economic crisis.
Figure 4 shows average yearly net contributions as well as minimum and maxi-
mum payments for the baseline scenario. Relative to GDP, Austria, Germany and the
Netherlands would have been the largest net contributors with average net contribu-
tions of 0.2 per cent in Germany, 0.25 per cent in Austria and 0.42 per cent in the
19Social insurance contributions include employer and employee contributions. If self-employed
were excluded from the scheme, the revenue-neutral contribution rate would be 1.8 per cent.
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Figure 3: Overall contributions and benets at Eurozone-level, 2000-13
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Note: Social insurance contributions (SIC) and benets (BEN) at Eurozone-level in nominal
terms. Contribution rate uniform across member states. Scheme is revenue-neutral over the
simulation period. Sources: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
Netherlands. Latvia (-0.33 per cent) and Spain (-0.53 per cent) would have been the
largest net recipients. Interestingly, the majority of member states would have been
net contributor in some years and net recipients in other years. Notable exceptions
are Austria and the Netherlands (France, Latvia and Spain) which would have always
been net contributors (recipients).
Finally, we compare the baseline scheme to variants with lower coverage and gen-
erosity levels. In terms of coverage, we introduce a waiting period for the rst two
months of the unemployment spell (variant B) and assume that only the share of
short-term unemployed covered by national unemployment insurance systems is eligi-
ble to the euro area scheme (variant C) as in the previous section. Moreover, we alter
the generosity by capping the maximum benet amount at 50 per cent of median in-
come in a given member state in a given year (variant D), by reducing the replacement
rate to 35 per cent of gross income (variant E) and by combining the latter two sce-
narios (variant F). Results are presented in Figures 5 and 6 and in Tables 3-6 in the
Appendix.
Figure 5 shows that a waiting period would reduce net contributions considerably
in most member states compared to the baseline scenario, in some cases by almost
50 per cent, indicating that a large share of the short-term unemployed was able to
nd a new job within a short time period. Seasonal (un)employment patterns are one
12
Figure 4: Average yearly net contributions, 2000-13
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Note: Net contributions = SIC - BEN. Contribution rate uniform across member states.
Scheme is revenue-neutral over the simulation period. Sources: Own calculations based on
EUROMOD.
factor explaining this nding. When only the share of short-term unemployed covered
by national unemployment insurance systems is eligible, net contributions shrink fur-
ther and some member states which are a net contributor in the baseline become a
net recipient (Belgium, Germany) or vice versa (Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Portugal,
Slovakia). This is due to large di¤erences in coverage rates of national unemployment
insurance systems as discussed in section 4.1.
Figure 6 shows that net contributions become smaller the less generous the euro
area unemployment scheme is. In the least generous case of a scheme with a 35 per
cent replacement rate and benets capped at 50 per cent of median income, average
net contributions shrink to 0.25 per cent of GDP in the Netherlands, the largest net
contributor, and to -0.31 per cent in Spain, the largest net recipient. Interestingly,
Estonia and Portugal become net contributors rather than net recipients if benets are
capped which is due to low median incomes in these member states.
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Figure 5: Average yearly net contributions - Di¤erent coverage scenarios
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Note: Net contributions = SIC - BEN. Contribution rate uniform across member states.
Scheme is revenue-neutral over the simulation period. Sources: EUROSTAT and own
calculations based on EUROMOD.
Figure 6: Average yearly net contributions - Di¤erent generosity levels
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Scheme is revenue-neutral over the simulation period. Sources: Own calculations based on
EUROMOD.
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4.3 Automatic scal stabilization
Automatic scal stabilization is associated with the ability of taxes and transfers to
automatically stabilize disposable income and consequently consumption in the event
of macroeconomic shocks. This relies on a simple mechanism: in the presence of a
given negative shock to gross income, taxes decline and transfers increase, with the
decline in disposable income being smaller than the shock to gross income (Auerbach
and Feenberg 2000, Kniesner and Ziliak 2002, Dolls et al. 2012). Several components of
government budgets are a¤ected by the macroeconomic situation in ways that operate
to smooth the business cycle, with progressive income taxes and unemployment benets
being the most prominent examples.20
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilization based on micro data is
the normalized tax changeused by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) which can be in-
terpreted as the tax systems built-in exibility(Pechman 1973, 1987). Based on this
idea, Dolls et al. (2012) dene the income stabilization coe¢ cient,  I , that shows how
changes in market income Y M (dened as the sum of all incomes from market activi-
ties such as (self)-employment, business and property income) translate into changes
in disposable income Y D (market income minus taxes plus benets) through changes
in net tax payments T . They extend the concept of normalized tax change to include
other taxes as well as SIC and transfers.
In our simulations, we follow their approach and calculate the income stabiliza-
tion e¤ects of all variants of the EMU-UI system presented throughout this paper.  is
computed using arithmetic changes () in benet and contribution payments as well as
changes in employment income from year t to t+1
 P
iBi,
P
iSICi and
P
iY
EMPL
i

which are aggregated across individuals i in each member state. Note that changes in
employment income as well as in contribution and benet payments are calculated for
employment changes along the extensive margin only in order to isolate the stabilizing
e¤ect in the event of unemployment shocks from (intensive margin) income shocks.
The income stabilization coe¢ cient for euro area unemployment insurance benets is
positive in a given member state if total benet payments in year t+1 are higher than
in year t and the total change in employment income following entries into employ-
ment/unemployment is negative, and zero otherwise:
BEN = max
  PiBiP
iY
EMPL
i
; 0

(1)
Accordingly, the income stabilization coe¢ cient for contribution payments is posi-
tive if total contributions in year t+1 are lower than in year t and the total change in
20Automatic stabilization might not only have e¤ects on disposable income and consumption but
also on GDP itself (cf. Fatás and Mihov 2001). If fewer taxes are collected and more transfers are
paid in a recession, this should support private incomes and dampen adverse movements in aggregate
demand.
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employment income is negative, and zero otherwise:
SIC = max
 P
iSICiP
iY
EMPL
i
; 0

(2)
The individual components of  can be a summed up to the total income stabiliza-
tion coe¢ cient,  I :
 I = BEN + SIC (3)
Income stabilization coe¢ cients for the so-called GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain), which were hardest hit during the recent crisis period,
are shown in Figures 7 and 8. Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix provide the full set of
results. Note that we focus on the total income stabilization coe¢ cient which is mainly
driven by increased benet payments and only to a small extent by lower contribution
payments. In fact, SIC is equal to the contribution rate of the scheme (see last row
of Table 1). In the baseline scenario, the euro area unemployment benet scheme
would have absorbed a considerable fraction of the overall unemployment shock in
2009 both at the euro area level (36 per cent) as well as in individual member states.
The fact that all member states would have been stabilized in 2009 can be explained
by the capacity of the scheme to build up decits in years with rising (short-time)
unemployment.21 For the GIIPS countries, we nd income stabilization coe¢ cients in
a range between 23-31 per cent at the beginning of the crisis, but lower stabilization
e¤ects in the following years which is due to rising long-term unemployment (and hence
lower coverage rates) in the more recent years of the crisis.22 In line with our results
presented in section 4.2, the euro area unemployment benet scheme is less e¤ective
in stabilizing disposable incomes the lower the coverage rates and the less generous
the scheme is. These ndings indicate that there is a trade-o¤ between the amount
of redistribution (ex-post) across member states on the one hand and the insurance
and stabilization e¤ects on the other hand as both are positively correlated. Hence,
it is interesting to compare the stabilizing e¤ects of a basic EMU-UI system covering
only short-term unemployment (for a maximum period of one year, i.e., 52 weeks)
to the extended and emergency unemployment benets provided by the US federal
government (with benets extended from 26 up to 99 weeks in many US states in the
2009-12 period). Given the longer duration of UI payments in the US, one can conclude
that a basic EMU-UI system (without further extensions) would only be an e¤ective
automatic stabilizer in short recessions. In prolonged recessions with more and more
21In fact, any shock absorption scheme without debt nancing can have destabilizing e¤ects if the
union as a whole is hit by a shock as in 2009. See Bargain et al. (2013) on the (de)stabilizing e¤ects
of a scal equalization system with a balanced budget rule.
22Note that the income stabilization coe¢ cient can be higher than the replacement rate of 50 per
cent if a member state faces a strong increase in the share of short-term unemployment, but not in
overall unemployment.
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long-term unemployed individuals, the coverage rates of the EMU-UI scheme decline
(see Figure 1) and a program such as the federal extensions in the US unemployment
insurance system would be more e¤ective as an automatic stabilizer in such a setting.
Figure 7: Income stabilization - Di¤erent coverage scenarios
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Note: Total income stabiliziation coe¢ cient  I for variants A (baseline), B (waiting period)
and C (coverage of national unemployment insurance systems). Sources: EUROSTAT and
own calculations based on EUROMOD.
17
Figure 8: Income stabilization - Di¤erent generosity levels
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5 Alternative scenarios
5.1 Experience rating and claw-back
The baseline scheme is calibrated to be revenue-neutral at the EMU-level over the
simulation period with a uniform contribution rate (1.57 per cent) across member
states. The analysis in the previous section has shown that a uniform contribution
rate would have led to permanent transfers in the euro area with 5 member states of
the EA18 being either net contributor (Austria and the Netherlands) or net recipient
(France, Latvia and Spain) in each year of the 2000-13 period. Therefore, an interesting
analytical exercise is to calculate country-specic contribution rates that balance the
budget in each member state either over the whole simulation period or in each year
(experience rating). The former are shown in Table 1 for the di¤erent specications of
the euro area unemployment insurance scheme presented throughout this paper. The
last row of Table 1 shows the uniform contribution rates that where estimated in the
previous section and balance the budget at the euro area, but not the member-state
level. Given the large di¤erences in net contributions across member states presented in
the previous section, it is not surprising that country-specic contribution rates di¤er
signicantly ranging from 0.75 per cent in the Netherlands to 3.3 per cent in Spain for
the baseline scenario. Less generous schemes (columns B-F in Table 1) require lower
contribution rates for revenue-neutrality.
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Table 1: Contribution rates for di¤erent specications
A B C D E F
AT 0.97 0.52 0.56 0.77 0.68 0.54
BE 1.39 0.82 0.88 1.25 0.97 0.88
CY 1.85 1.12 0.52 1.52 1.30 1.06
EE 1.57 0.91 0.65 1.22 1.10 0.86
FI 1.74 0.80 1.13 1.56 1.22 1.09
FR 2.07 1.11 1.04 1.76 1.45 1.23
GE 1.15 0.69 0.90 0.97 0.81 0.68
GR 2.08 1.39 0.60 1.49 1.46 1.04
IE 1.81 1.11 0.80 1.34 1.27 0.94
IT 1.50 0.95 0.13 1.27 1.05 0.89
LU 1.10 0.64 0.45 0.86 0.77 0.60
LV 3.05 1.96 0.90 2.23 2.13 1.56
MT 1.19 0.65 0.47 1.06 0.83 0.74
NL 0.75 0.42 0.33 0.62 0.53 0.43
PT 1.82 1.16 0.74 1.19 1.27 0.83
SI 1.39 0.92 0.48 1.15 0.98 0.81
SK 1.84 1.39 0.44 1.63 1.29 1.14
SP 3.30 1.88 1.23 2.76 2.31 1.93
EA18 1.57 0.92 0.78 1.31 1.10 0.92
Notes: Country-specic contribution rates (in % of employment income) that balance the
budget in each member state over the simulation period. Last row: uniform contribution
rates that balance the overall budget at Eurozone-level (but not in each single member
state). A: Baseline, all new unemployed with previous employment income covered. B:
Waiting period, no benets paid in the rst 2 months of the unemployment spell. C:
National coverage, only the share of short-term unemployed covered by national
unemployment insurance systems eligible to benets from euro area scheme. D: Maximum
benet 50 per cent of median income. E: 50 per cent replacement rate applied to 70 per
cent of gross income, i.e., net replacement rate of 35 per cent. F: D + E combined. Sources:
EUROSTAT and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
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Figure 9 presents average country-specic contribution rates that balance national
budgets in each year as well as maximum and minimum contribution rates over the
period. In Austria and the Netherlands, the two member states that would have
been permanent net contributors, revenue-neutral contribution rates would have always
been below the uniform (Eurozone-wide) contribution rate of 1.57 per cent (dashed
horizontal line), while the opposite is true for France, Latvia and Spain, the three net
recipients throughout the simulation period in the baseline scenario (variant A).
Figure 9: Country-specic contribution rates: Annual balanced budget
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Note: Dashed horizontal line: Revenue-neutral uniform contribution rate (1.57 per cent) at
EMU-level for the period 2000-13. Blue bars: Average country-specic contribution rates
that balance the budget in each single year. Black vertical lines: Maximum/Minimum
country-specic contribution rates that balance the budget in each single year. Sources:
Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
However, an important implementation problem with experience rating is that in
practice, the revenue-neutral contribution rate is not known ex-ante (neither for the
euro area as a whole nor for its member states). A potential way to reduce cross-country
transfers could be to determine pre-specied rules, i.e., claw-back mechanisms, that
adjust (country-specic) contribution rates automatically after certain time intervals
based on previous balances. In the US, for instance, each state places its unemployment
insurance payroll taxes in a trust fund with the Treasury and state-specic tax rates are
raised if trust funds become insolvent (Vroman and Woodbury 2014).23 We consider
23Note that this automatism can have undesirable side e¤ects such as pro-cyclical adjustments of
unemployment insurance payroll taxes during economic downturns.
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two stylized types of claw-back mechanisms and examine their e¤ect on each member
states net contributions over time. Under the rst claw-back mechanism (Claw-back
A), member-state specic contribution rates are applied in the current period that
would have balanced the (national) budget in the previous period. Under the second
claw-back mechanism (Claw-back B), past accumulated decits or surpluses are taken
into account as follows. In the initial period, we apply the Eurozone-wide revenue-
neutral contribution rate (1.57 per cent) which leads to an unbalanced budget at the
member-state level. In the subsequent periods, country-specic contribution rates are
applied that would have reduced the net balance of the previous period by 50 per cent.
For both claw-back mechanisms, contribution rates are adjusted in 3-year intervals
(2000-02, 2003-05, 2006-08, 2009-11, 2012-13).
Cumulative net contributions under Claw-back A and B are presented in Figure 10,
together with net contributions that would have accrued under uniform and country-
specic contribution rates (column A of Table 1). The latter two cases can be in-
terpreted as benchmark scenarios for our claw-back mechanisms as they are based
on contribution rates which ex-post guarantee revenue neutrality at the euro area and
member-state level. Figure 10 illustrates that ex-post adjustments of contribution rates
reduce accumulated decits or surpluses, relative to the counterfactual of a uniform
contribution rate, in some, but not all member states. In France, Germany, Greece,
Latvia, Malta, and Spain, this holds for both claw-back mechanisms and in Austria,
Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands for Claw-back B. In a few cases,
the accumulated net balance at the end of the simulation period is amplied (Cyprus,
Ireland, Portugal). In other member states, claw-back mechanisms result in a net con-
tributor (recipient) becoming a net recipient (contributor), namely Austria, Belgium,
Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands under Claw-back A and Italy, Slovenia
and Slovakia under Claw-back A and B. Note that we nd similar results with other
claw-back mechanisms based on shorter or longer adjustment periods.24 These simu-
lations show that claw-back mechanisms could be useful tools to reduce cross-country
transfers, but that this does not hold in a systematic way in all member states. The
trade-o¤between the degree of cross-country redistribution and automatic stabilization
e¤ects would become especially apparent if member states were forced to increase the
contribution rate and thus the tax wedge on wages during a recession.
24These additional results are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 10: Cumulative net contributions - Claw-back
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budget in the previous 3-year interval are applied to the contemporaneous 3-year period. Claw-back B: Net
contributions for the initial 3-year period are calculated based on the revenue-neutral uniform contribution rate. In all
subsequent 3-year periods, country-specic contribution rates that would have reduced the net balance of the previous
3-year interval by 50 per cent are applied to the contemporaneous 3-year period. Sources: Own calculations based on
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5.2 Contingent transfers
As a further variant we simulate an EMU-UI scheme with contingent benets which are
activated once certain triggers are reached and analyze its stabilizing and redistributive
properties, in particular if such a scheme reduces cross-country transfers. Our choice
of the trigger is guided by the US Extended Benet (EB) program which permits
states to use either the insured or the total unemployment rate to qualify for extended
unemployment benets (Nicholson et al. 2014). We choose the total unemployment
rate as a trigger so that activation of contingent transfers is independent from eligibility
conditions of national unemployment insurance systems. Precisely, benets from the
EMU-UI system are triggered if the unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 percentage
point higher than the unemployment rate in i) year t 1, ii) years t 1 or t 2, iii) years
t 1 or t 2 or t 3. Longer look-back periods ensure that EMU-UI benets can remain
activated in sustained periods of high unemployment rates.25 In all other dimensions
(payout rules, uniform contribution rate across member states), the contingent benet
schemes i-iii are identical to the baseline scheme (variant A) which implies that by
construction member states are net contributors in those years when contingent benets
are not triggered.
Table 9 in the Appendix shows that while with a three-year look-back period,
contingent benets would have been triggered in all member states at least once, they
would not have been activated in Malta (Belgium and Malta) in any year with a two-
year (one-year) look-back period. The divergent development of unemployment rates
since the start of the euro in 1999 becomes evident by a comparison of activation
periods in di¤erent member states. While the short-term unemployed in Germany or
Luxembourg, for instance, would have been eligible to EMU-UI benets only in the
period 2003-05 (and in 2013 in Luxembourg under variant iii), transfers would have
been activated in Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain only from 2008 onwards (with the
exception of Greece under variant iii in 2000). Not surprisingly, with average yearly
benet and contribution payments of 13, 19 and 21 billion euro at the Eurozone-level,
the overall budget of the contingent benet schemes i-iii would have been signicantly
lower than in our baseline scenario with non-contingent benets (49 billion per year).
Consequently, revenue-neutral contribution rates would have been less than half as
large as in the baseline (0.41, 0.61 and 0.68 rather than 1.57 per cent on employment
income).
Figure 11 compares cumulative net contributions under the contingent benet
schemes to the baseline variant. A key nding is that the redistributive e¤ects of
the contingent benet schemes di¤er to the baseline in several instances as evidenced
25In the US the Tax Relief Act changed the look-back period in the EB program from a two-year to
a three-year period in the recent recession to increase its stabilization impact (Nicholson and Needels
2011).
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by the fact that a few member states change their net contributing position in terms
of accumulated net contributions at the end of the simulation period (Finland, France,
Italy, Slovenia). Austria and the Netherlands, the two member states which would have
been net contributors in each year in the baseline, are now net receivers in some years.
In the Netherlands, accumulated net contributions are reduced by more than 50 per
cent by the end of the simulation period relative to the baseline. Spain, a net recipient
in the baseline throughout the simulation period, is a net contributor until 2007 and
a net recipient in the remaining years. These results show that an EMU-UI system
with contingent benets could indeed provide more targeted transfers to member states
which see their labor market conditions signicantly deteriorating.
What are the automatic stabilization e¤ects of such a scheme? Given that the
contingent benet schemes considered here correspond to the non-contingent baseline
scheme in all dimensions besides the activation of the scheme, stabilization e¤ects are
similar once EMU-UI benets are triggered. However, it must be taken into account
that countries that have not reached the trigger (but might well be in a recession) would
be worse o¤ compared to the baseline EMU-UI system as the link between contribution
and benet payments would be broken. The reason is that households in these member
states would need to nance both their national unemployment insurance system as
well as the EMU-UI system because the former would not be (partly) replaced by
the latter if the trigger is not reached. This potential destabilizing e¤ect could be
prevented by suspending contribution payments to the EMU-UI system under certain
circumstances such as rising unemployment rates.
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Figure 11: Cumulative net contributions - Contingent benets
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scheme ii): 2-year look-back period, i.e., bene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point higher than in t-1 OR t-2. Contingent scheme iii): 3-year look-back period, i.e., benets are triggered if
unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than in t-1 OR t-2 OR t-3. Sources: Own
calculations based on EUROMOD.
25
6 Conclusion
The economic crisis in the Eurozone has revived the debate on deeper scal integration
and has brought this topic to the top of the European policy agenda. A common
unemployment insurance system is one key reform proposal which could serve as a
scal risk sharing mechanism in the euro area. Supporters of this idea argue that
a centralized EMU-UI system would dampen asymmetric shocks in the Eurozone and
provide income insurance to those households which are most vulnerable. It would thus
not only improve the economic resilience of EMU and make its institutional architecture
more sustainable, but also strengthen the social dimension of European policy-making.
However, main concerns include the risk of permanent transfer ows across member
states and moral hazard for national governments and administrations, which could
lead to adverse labor market e¤ects.
The aim of this paper has been to present di¤erent options for the design of a
common unemployment insurance system and to assess their redistributive and sta-
bilizing properties. Moreover, we have discussed how di¤erent design options would
a¤ect moral hazard issues. In our empirical analysis, we have used counterfactual sim-
ulation techniques based on harmonized European micro data to examine the economic
e¤ects of a hypothetical common EMU-UI system for the time period 2000-13. Our
main results can be summarized as follows. A basic scheme, partly replacing national
unemployment insurance systems, with a replacement rate of 50 per cent, a maximum
duration of benet receipt of 12 months and a broad coverage of all new unemployed
with previous employment income could be implemented with a relatively small an-
nual budget. On average, it would have amounted to 49 billion euro per year at the
Eurozone-level nanced by a contribution rate of 1.57 per cent on employment income.
The scheme would have provided signicant income stabilization at the beginning of
the recent economic crisis absorbing 36 per cent of the unemployment shock in 2009 at
the Eurozone-level, but due to its focus on short-term unemployment this e¤ect would
have diminished, the longer the crisis lasted. We nd, perhaps surprisingly given that
the scheme does not lead to permanent redistribution per se, that 5 out of 18 member
states would have been either net contributor or net recipient in each year of our simu-
lation period. Running various sensitivity checks regarding the coverage and generosity
of the scheme, we show that there is a trade-o¤ between the degree of cross-country
redistribution and desired automatic stabilization e¤ects.
We therefore investigate whether claw-back mechanisms based on experience rating
and contingent benet schemes lead to smaller accumulated net balances. In a rst
step, we calculate country-specic contribution rates that would have balanced national
budgets either over the whole period or in every single year. These range from 0.75
per cent in the Netherlands to 3.3 per cent in Spain in the former and from 0.46
per cent in Luxembourg to 5.8 per cent in Latvia in the latter case. In the next step,
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analyzing two stylized claw-back mechanisms under which country-specic contribution
rates are adjusted in 3-year intervals based on previous net balances, we nd that they
lead to smaller net contributions in some, but not all member states. Finally, our
analysis shows that a common EMU-UI system with contingent benets would lead to
less cross-country redistribution as it would provide more targeted transfers to member
states with deteriorating labor market conditions. However, claw-back mechanisms and
contingent benets can have undesirable side e¤ects such as pro-cyclical adjustments
of contribution rates or a broken link between contribution and benet payments if
benets are not activated.
We should emphasize that our analysis has a number of limitations which should
be taken into account in the interpretation of the results. Most importantly, it is not
the objective of this paper to establish whether or not the introduction of an EMU-UI
scheme is desirable in terms of economic welfare. Our analysis focuses on the nancial
ows implied by di¤erent unemployment insurance schemes and the ability of these
ows to act as an automatic stabilizer. In so far our analysis is purely positive, rather
than normative. In addition, we take economic behavior as given. If EMU-UI had
the desired stabilizing e¤ects, the nancial ows in the system would di¤er from those
calculated here; the redistributive e¤ects would probably be smaller. However, if the
moral hazard e¤ects dominated, the nancial ows from contributors to recipients
could also be larger. Adding behavioral e¤ects to the analysis is a promising subject
for future research.
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Table 2: Coverage rates EMU-UI
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 71.5 43.2 48.8 73.9 42.4 47.9 83.6 49.9 61.2 77.0 44.7 56.8 72.2 39.3 44.4
BE 43.7 25.6 27.9 48.3 30.4 31.6 50.4 31.4 33.3 53.7 34.3 35.5 50.4 32.1 34.1
CY 74.3 44.3 27.7 78.8 44.1 29.6 79.9 50.2 32.3 76.0 45.5 31.0 71.8 45.2 29.5
EE 53.1 31.5 23.5 54.5 38.8 23.3 48.8 29.4 20.8 57.7 31.2 24.7 47.6 27.9 21.5
FI 75.4 39.5 48.2 76.4 38.3 49.2 78.8 39.7 49.0 78.7 42.1 49.6 78.9 42.9 48.9
FR 60.3 38.2 28.5 63.2 39.1 30.4 67.3 40.5 35.8 62.4 32.0 32.9 60.9 33.1 30.1
GE 48.5 30.9 36.4 49.6 31.7 37.3 52.1 33.8 40.6 50.0 33.6 39.3 48.2 31.2 36.5
GR 43.3 31.1 8.5 47.2 29.1 9.8 47.4 35.4 10.8 43.8 31.5 9.1 45.2 33.5 10.2
IE 61.8 33.1 25.0 66.4 31.6 27.8 70.6 38.5 30.1 64.5 36.0 28.0 65.7 35.4 28.6
IT 38.7 27.7 2.5 36.6 24.3 3.0 40.8 28.8 2.0 41.8 28.8 1.8 50.4 29.1 3.6
LU 77.6 45.1 31.4 71.6 32.8 30.0 72.6 39.0 30.4 75.3 44.0 38.9 79.0 46.0 32.2
LV 42.9 31.3 12.9 40.9 28.3 11.0 57.8 36.3 18.4 54.8 33.7 20.2 56.1 33.4 18.4
MT 44.0 19.0 17.8 56.7 24.9 23.8 61.8 29.6 26.4 65.7 25.3 28.6 50.5 26.8 22.0
NL 73.4 41.6 29.7 73.4 41.6 30.8 73.4 41.6 31.3 71.0 39.8 30.9 67.3 42.6 29.3
PT 56.1 33.6 22.5 60.8 36.9 16.0 64.5 41.0 21.1 67.3 44.6 23.3 56.9 39.1 23.7
SI 37.3 25.3 12.1 36.8 24.0 12.3 45.3 31.7 18.4 43.3 33.2 21.4 46.9 35.0 23.4
SK 45.3 33.9 21.0 41.7 34.3 13.8 34.7 28.5 9.9 33.8 26.9 9.2 36.1 29.6 10.2
SP 57.6 37.3 12.5 63.5 37.5 14.0 66.2 41.4 14.6 66.4 43.3 14.8 67.4 41.2 16.7
EA18 55.8 34.0 24.3 57.8 33.9 24.5 60.9 37.0 27.0 60.2 36.1 27.6 58.4 35.7 25.7
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 74.8 37.8 46.2 72.6 37.6 44.2 73.2 37.9 44.1 75.8 37.6 46.3 78.7 41.5 40.6
BE 48.3 26.9 32.4 48.8 27.9 32.2 49.6 27.6 30.6 52.5 27.9 32.7 55.8 31.8 36.1
CY 76.6 43.0 16.0 80.7 46.4 35.8 81.4 46.2 34.2 86.4 45.7 25.8 89.7 47.2 20.6
EE 46.6 24.1 22.0 51.8 27.9 23.8 50.8 22.0 22.5 69.9 32.3 18.8 72.6 43.1 31.9
FI 74.2 35.1 46.6 74.8 34.0 45.4 77.2 34.2 49.3 81.6 31.1 54.4 83.3 35.7 55.2
FR 58.9 30.5 29.7 58.0 29.1 29.1 59.8 29.0 26.6 62.6 29.2 29.9 64.8 33.5 32.9
GE 47.0 28.7 36.7 43.6 26.1 33.8 43.4 24.5 33.3 47.5 26.9 35.3 54.5 31.2 42.6
GR 47.9 31.7 12.7 45.7 32.7 12.6 50.1 31.3 13.8 52.5 30.9 13.9 59.2 35.0 18.6
IE 66.6 32.2 33.6 68.4 41.5 31.4 70.4 42.6 31.2 72.9 43.8 30.9 70.9 43.9 32.9
IT 50.1 29.4 2.9 50.4 29.5 3.2 52.6 29.7 3.4 54.4 31.1 3.6 55.6 34.7 5.5
LU 73.6 40.1 36.3 70.5 44.6 29.5 71.3 43.7 27.2 67.8 36.3 30.7 76.8 49.5 30.3
LV 54.1 33.3 15.7 63.4 35.3 15.9 73.7 37.6 27.7 74.3 40.8 20.6 73.3 49.8 22.8
MT 53.6 30.3 19.7 59.4 32.8 24.1 58.0 29.9 25.7 57.8 31.3 24.5 56.5 35.2 26.2
NL 59.8 36.3 30.2 57.1 33.2 26.2 60.7 33.2 26.9 65.6 32.8 27.8 75.8 40.6 35.2
PT 51.9 33.0 21.1 49.8 31.1 21.0 52.9 32.5 21.8 52.6 30.2 19.2 55.8 34.5 27.8
SI 52.7 35.1 20.7 50.7 33.9 17.2 54.3 31.8 16.4 57.8 32.3 16.8 69.9 41.7 25.6
SK 28.0 20.6 6.0 23.7 17.7 4.3 25.8 18.3 4.1 30.5 20.6 4.9 46.0 32.1 9.2
SP 75.5 33.5 38.1 78.3 32.3 22.2 79.6 32.5 23.0 82.2 36.4 27.1 76.3 45.0 34.0
EA18 57.8 32.3 25.9 58.2 33.0 25.1 60.3 32.5 25.7 63.6 33.2 25.7 67.5 39.2 29.3
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2010 2011 2012 2013
A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 74.8 39.2 39.7 74.1 37.2 39.6 75.3 38.0 37.5 75.7 41.1 31.3
BE 51.2 30.3 31.4 51.6 30.7 31.2 55.3 32.7 32.8 53.9 33.2 32.8
CY 79.7 45.8 19.1 79.2 48.9 18.2 69.9 44.8 16.1 61.8 41.7 13.4
EE 54.7 37.4 26.4 43.2 23.3 16.0 45.8 25.4 14.7 55.5 31.5 22.7
FI 76.0 32.9 52.6 77.8 31.6 50.6 78.7 32.4 54.6 79.2 33.5 53.7
FR 59.8 31.0 32.4 58.5 29.8 28.5 59.6 30.3 31.7 59.7 36.8 30.6
GE 52.6 30.3 40.0 52.0 27.7 42.1 54.6 28.7 46.0 55.3 29.9 46.5
GR 55.0 34.0 18.8 50.4 32.5 17.7 40.7 27.6 13.9 32.6 23.2 9.2
IE 50.9 34.7 23.7 40.7 26.8 17.3 38.3 24.5 16.4 39.4 24.9 16.3
IT 51.6 32.8 5.7 48.1 31.4 5.0 47.0 30.8 5.5 43.1 28.4 6.0
LU 70.7 40.5 30.2 71.4 43.0 26.3 69.7 39.3 28.0 69.6 42.3 26.3
LV 54.9 41.9 18.2 45.5 30.5 10.7 47.9 29.8 11.4 51.3 32.0 15.1
MT 53.5 35.7 16.1 53.6 32.7 17.4 52.8 32.2 17.4 55.5 32.4 19.3
NL 72.5 40.4 33.7 66.5 35.4 28.3 66.3 35.3 28.4 64.5 38.0 26.7
PT 47.7 31.2 22.6 51.9 31.6 20.0 51.4 33.6 21.1 43.8 29.2 18.8
SI 56.7 39.0 19.9 55.8 35.8 20.0 52.1 33.1 14.4 49.0 33.7 12.4
SK 36.0 27.7 8.0 32.1 24.4 6.4 32.7 24.4 6.7 29.8 21.8 5.7
SP 63.4 38.2 29.8 58.4 34.8 24.5 55.6 34.3 24.2 50.3 31.2 20.2
EA18 59.0 35.7 26.0 56.2 32.7 23.3 55.2 32.1 23.4 53.9 32.5 22.6
Notes: Coverage rates in per cent of all unemployed. A: Baseline, all new unemployed with
previous employment income covered. B: Waiting period, no benets paid in the rst 2
months of the unemployment spell. C: National coverage, only the share of short-term
unemployed covered by national unemployment insurance systems receives benets.
Sources: EUROSTAT and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
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Table 3: Net contributions (per cent of GDP) - Di¤erent coverage scenarios
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 0.34 0.19 0.11 0.33 0.19 0.11 0.22 0.12 0.01 0.25 0.14 0.03 0.21 0.14 0.06
BE 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.07
CY 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.11
EE -0.19 -0.12 -0.06 -0.14 -0.16 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05
FI -0.20 -0.06 -0.22 -0.14 -0.02 -0.19 -0.16 -0.03 -0.18 -0.16 -0.05 -0.19 -0.14 -0.05 -0.16
FR -0.13 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.14 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.05 -0.06
GE 0.24 0.11 -0.03 0.23 0.10 -0.03 0.13 0.03 -0.12 0.07 -0.02 -0.18 0.04 -0.03 -0.18
GR -0.04 -0.10 0.15 -0.06 -0.05 0.14 -0.04 -0.12 0.14 0.04 -0.04 0.16 -0.02 -0.10 0.14
IE 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.07
IT 0.02 -0.04 0.18 0.09 0.02 0.18 0.07 -0.00 0.19 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.19
LU 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.27 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05
LV -0.26 -0.24 -0.01 -0.19 -0.17 0.03 -0.33 -0.22 -0.04 -0.25 -0.16 -0.05 -0.26 -0.16 -0.03
MT 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.12 0.11
NL 0.48 0.29 0.27 0.54 0.32 0.29 0.49 0.29 0.26 0.40 0.24 0.22 0.34 0.17 0.19
PT 0.23 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.11 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.05
SI 0.17 0.07 0.14 0.20 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.06
SK -0.39 -0.35 -0.17 -0.36 -0.37 -0.06 -0.22 -0.26 0.01 -0.17 -0.20 0.03 -0.22 -0.25 0.01
SP -0.19 -0.16 0.11 -0.18 -0.11 0.11 -0.27 -0.19 0.09 -0.27 -0.21 0.08 -0.24 -0.16 0.07
EA18 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.22 0.15 0.06 0.25 0.17 0.08 0.29 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.09
BE 0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.08 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.07
CY 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.15 -0.09 -0.02 0.13
EE 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.30 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.17 -0.49 -0.30 -0.18
FI -0.05 0.05 -0.12 0.00 0.09 -0.07 0.06 0.11 -0.05 0.07 0.16 -0.06 -0.13 0.05 -0.20
FR -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.18 -0.06 -0.10
GE -0.01 -0.03 -0.23 0.12 0.06 -0.12 0.23 0.14 -0.03 0.27 0.16 0.01 0.18 0.11 -0.09
GR -0.02 -0.05 0.12 0.06 -0.02 0.13 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.14 -0.11 -0.07 0.06
IE 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.56 -0.36 -0.24
IT 0.04 0.02 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.20 -0.01 -0.03 0.18
LU 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.06
LV -0.16 -0.11 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.06 -0.00 0.02 -0.20 -0.10 0.04 -1.06 -0.76 -0.26
MT 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.08
NL 0.36 0.20 0.18 0.44 0.26 0.23 0.49 0.29 0.26 0.51 0.32 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.23
PT 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.07 -0.18 -0.13 -0.09
SI 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.06
SK -0.05 -0.08 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.13 -0.11 -0.12 0.08
SP -0.19 -0.01 -0.10 -0.15 0.02 0.06 -0.14 0.03 0.06 -0.45 -0.13 -0.06 -1.07 -0.63 -0.45
EA18 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.05 -0.11 -0.05 -0.06
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2010 2011 2012 2013
A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.27 0.19 0.12 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.14
BE 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.06
CY -0.13 -0.07 0.12 -0.32 -0.22 0.08 -0.64 -0.44 0.00 -0.89 -0.65 -0.04
EE -0.44 -0.35 -0.20 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.07
FI -0.08 0.07 -0.19 -0.03 0.11 -0.13 -0.03 0.11 -0.16 -0.09 0.08 -0.19
FR -0.15 -0.05 -0.10 -0.13 -0.04 -0.06 -0.18 -0.06 -0.11 -0.22 -0.15 -0.12
GE 0.25 0.15 -0.01 0.35 0.22 0.04 0.36 0.23 0.04 0.37 0.23 0.05
GR -0.29 -0.20 -0.02 -0.57 -0.40 -0.13 -0.74 -0.55 -0.18 -0.63 -0.51 -0.08
IE -0.40 -0.32 -0.17 -0.26 -0.20 -0.08 -0.22 -0.17 -0.07 -0.16 -0.12 -0.03
IT -0.01 -0.03 0.18 0.02 -0.02 0.18 -0.11 -0.10 0.17 -0.14 -0.13 0.15
LU 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.05
LV -0.78 -0.66 -0.20 -0.38 -0.28 -0.00 -0.35 -0.23 0.00 -0.23 -0.16 0.00
MT 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.14
NL 0.37 0.22 0.19 0.41 0.26 0.23 0.33 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.12 0.16
PT -0.16 -0.14 -0.07 -0.28 -0.18 -0.05 -0.47 -0.34 -0.15 -0.37 -0.29 -0.12
SI -0.02 -0.07 0.06 -0.08 -0.08 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 0.08 -0.14 -0.15 0.08
SK -0.09 -0.13 0.07 -0.02 -0.07 0.09 -0.03 -0.08 0.09 -0.01 -0.05 0.10
SP -0.97 -0.60 -0.44 -0.99 -0.60 -0.37 -1.18 -0.75 -0.48 -1.11 -0.71 -0.40
EA18 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03
Notes: Net contributions (SIC - BEN) in per cent of GDP. A: Baseline, all new unemployed
with previous employment income covered. B: Waiting period, no benets paid in the rst 2
months of the unemployment spell. C: National coverage, only the share of short-term
unemployed covered by national unemployment insurance systems receives benets.
Sources: EUROSTAT and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
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Table 4: Net contributions (in billion euro) - Di¤erent coverage scenarios
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 0.70 0.39 0.23 0.70 0.41 0.25 0.49 0.27 0.03 0.56 0.33 0.06 0.50 0.33 0.13
BE 0.43 0.25 0.09 0.40 0.19 0.05 0.23 0.09 -0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.21 0.08 -0.03 -0.21
CY 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
EE -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
FI -0.26 -0.09 -0.29 -0.20 -0.02 -0.26 -0.24 -0.05 -0.26 -0.23 -0.08 -0.27 -0.21 -0.07 -0.25
FR -1.92 -1.51 -0.76 -1.53 -1.16 -0.64 -2.17 -1.43 -1.38 -1.91 -0.53 -1.21 -2.11 -0.88 -1.03
GE 4.87 2.19 -0.63 4.86 2.13 -0.71 2.84 0.70 -2.66 1.49 -0.53 -3.86 0.85 -0.59 -3.95
GR -0.05 -0.14 0.21 -0.08 -0.07 0.20 -0.06 -0.18 0.22 0.07 -0.07 0.28 -0.04 -0.18 0.26
IE 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.11
IT 0.29 -0.46 2.18 1.08 0.30 2.25 0.95 -0.01 2.51 0.97 0.05 2.70 0.27 0.19 2.60
LU 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
LV -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00
MT 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
NL 2.02 1.19 1.11 2.42 1.43 1.28 2.29 1.36 1.23 1.91 1.16 1.06 1.65 0.85 0.95
PT 0.29 0.16 0.18 0.27 0.15 0.23 0.15 0.06 0.17 -0.03 -0.08 0.10 0.05 -0.04 0.08
SI 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02
SK -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.00
SP -1.23 -1.01 0.67 -1.19 -0.73 0.72 -1.94 -1.37 0.62 -2.11 -1.65 0.64 -2.03 -1.37 0.58
EA18 5.29 1.05 3.13 6.93 2.72 3.55 2.69 -0.51 0.57 0.92 -1.41 -0.55 -0.85 -1.75 -0.68
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 0.41 0.33 0.07 0.56 0.40 0.16 0.67 0.46 0.23 0.82 0.56 0.30 0.53 0.38 0.24
BE 0.13 0.11 -0.18 0.15 0.10 -0.16 0.29 0.21 -0.02 0.33 0.27 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.24
CY 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.02
EE 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03
FI -0.09 0.07 -0.19 0.01 0.14 -0.12 0.10 0.21 -0.10 0.14 0.30 -0.12 -0.22 0.09 -0.35
FR -1.90 -0.53 -1.01 -1.84 -0.32 -0.95 -1.16 0.18 -0.12 -0.94 0.47 -0.31 -3.35 -1.21 -1.80
GE -0.14 -0.59 -5.11 2.78 1.37 -2.86 5.51 3.44 -0.73 6.59 4.04 0.25 4.22 2.61 -2.06
GR -0.03 -0.10 0.23 0.13 -0.05 0.27 0.12 0.03 0.28 0.17 0.09 0.32 -0.26 -0.17 0.14
IE 0.20 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.11 -0.11 -0.08 0.01 -0.90 -0.59 -0.40
IT 0.56 0.31 2.79 1.28 0.73 2.90 1.72 1.09 3.01 1.07 0.69 3.08 -0.14 -0.38 2.77
LU 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
LV -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.20 -0.14 -0.05
MT 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
NL 1.85 1.03 0.90 2.40 1.40 1.25 2.78 1.68 1.46 3.03 1.89 1.61 2.49 1.55 1.31
PT 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.11 -0.30 -0.22 -0.15
SI 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.00 -0.00 0.02
SK -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.08 -0.07 -0.07 0.05
SP -1.73 -0.13 -0.91 -1.48 0.24 0.64 -1.50 0.33 0.68 -4.91 -1.37 -0.66 -11.17 -6.63 -4.68
EA18 -0.69 0.62 -3.13 4.35 4.16 1.48 8.88 7.77 5.07 6.37 6.99 4.82 -9.40 -4.76 -5.17
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2010 2011 2012 2013
A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 0.71 0.48 0.32 0.81 0.56 0.36 0.79 0.55 0.39 0.63 0.42 0.43
BE 0.10 0.04 -0.15 0.34 0.18 0.00 0.14 0.07 -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 -0.23
CY -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 -0.15 -0.11 -0.01
EE -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
FI -0.13 0.13 -0.34 -0.06 0.21 -0.24 -0.06 0.21 -0.31 -0.17 0.15 -0.36
FR -2.88 -0.97 -1.92 -2.61 -0.71 -1.19 -3.69 -1.23 -2.27 -4.49 -3.06 -2.45
GE 6.23 3.72 -0.36 9.04 5.82 1.02 9.65 6.25 0.95 10.19 6.40 1.25
GR -0.64 -0.44 -0.04 -1.18 -0.83 -0.26 -1.44 -1.07 -0.35 -1.15 -0.93 -0.15
IE -0.63 -0.50 -0.27 -0.43 -0.33 -0.13 -0.36 -0.27 -0.11 -0.26 -0.20 -0.05
IT -0.20 -0.51 2.76 0.30 -0.32 2.91 -1.66 -1.62 2.61 -2.25 -2.05 2.32
LU 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
LV -0.14 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.00 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.00
MT 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
NL 2.14 1.32 1.14 2.46 1.55 1.39 2.00 1.31 1.19 1.30 0.74 0.95
PT -0.28 -0.24 -0.11 -0.48 -0.31 -0.09 -0.78 -0.56 -0.25 -0.61 -0.47 -0.21
SI -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.03
SK -0.06 -0.09 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.07
SP -10.19 -6.26 -4.63 -10.36 -6.25 -3.92 -12.15 -7.67 -4.98 -11.40 -7.28 -4.10
EA18 -6.02 -3.51 -3.54 -2.29 -0.58 -0.00 -7.75 -4.22 -3.07 -8.44 -6.57 -2.46
Notes: Net contributions (SIC - BEN) in billion euro. A: Baseline, all new unemployed with
previous employment income covered. B: Waiting period, no benets paid in the rst 2
months of the unemployment spell. C: National coverage, only the share of short-term
unemployed covered by national unemployment insurance systems receives benets.
Sources: EUROSTAT and own calculations based on EUROMOD.
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Table 5: Net contributions (per cent of GDP) - Di¤erent generosity levels
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
D E F D E F D E F D E F D E F
AT 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.14
BE 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
CY 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.08
EE -0.11 -0.13 -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.05
FI -0.22 -0.14 -0.15 -0.17 -0.10 -0.12 -0.19 -0.11 -0.13 -0.18 -0.11 -0.13 -0.17 -0.10 -0.12
FR -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08
GE 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03
GR 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.03
IE 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.08
IT 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00
LU 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.04
LV -0.17 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.08 -0.23 -0.23 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.12 -0.18 -0.18 -0.12
MT 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 0.11 0.08
NL 0.40 0.34 0.28 0.45 0.38 0.31 0.42 0.34 0.29 0.35 0.28 0.25 0.29 0.23 0.21
PT 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.08
SI 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.07
SK -0.35 -0.28 -0.25 -0.34 -0.25 -0.24 -0.22 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.12 -0.12 -0.21 -0.15 -0.15
SP -0.18 -0.14 -0.13 -0.17 -0.12 -0.12 -0.23 -0.19 -0.16 -0.25 -0.19 -0.17 -0.22 -0.17 -0.16
EA18 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
D E F D E F D E F D E F D E F
AT 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.13
BE -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
CY 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04
EE 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.12 -0.26 -0.34 -0.18
FI -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09
FR -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10
GE 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.11
GR 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01
IE 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.28 -0.39 -0.20
IT 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
LU 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04
LV -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.14 -0.06 -0.60 -0.74 -0.42
MT 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07
NL 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.36 0.31 0.25 0.40 0.34 0.28 0.42 0.36 0.29 0.37 0.30 0.26
PT 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.06 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01
SI 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.01
SK -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07
SP -0.18 -0.13 -0.12 -0.14 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.10 -0.10 -0.35 -0.32 -0.25 -0.81 -0.75 -0.57
EA18 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05
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2010 2011 2012 2013
D E F D E F D E F D E F
AT 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.13
BE -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02
CY -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.25 -0.22 -0.17 -0.47 -0.45 -0.33 -0.68 -0.62 -0.48
EE -0.29 -0.31 -0.20 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
FI -0.11 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08
FR -0.14 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.16 -0.13 -0.11 -0.19 -0.15 -0.13
GE 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.31 0.26 0.22
GR -0.12 -0.20 -0.08 -0.29 -0.40 -0.21 -0.40 -0.52 -0.28 -0.39 -0.44 -0.27
IE -0.25 -0.28 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.12 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07
IT -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08
LU 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03
LV -0.54 -0.55 -0.38 -0.27 -0.27 -0.19 -0.24 -0.25 -0.17 -0.15 -0.16 -0.11
MT 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.08
NL 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.34 0.29 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.14
PT -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 -0.10 -0.20 -0.07 -0.20 -0.33 -0.14 -0.17 -0.26 -0.12
SI 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.07
SK -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02
SP -0.82 -0.68 -0.57 -0.84 -0.69 -0.59 -0.97 -0.83 -0.68 -0.95 -0.78 -0.66
EA18 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05
Notes: Net contributions (SIC - BEN) in per cent of GDP. D, E, F: Baseline coverage of
EMU-UI (no waiting period, all new unemployed covered) D: Maximum benet 50 per cent
of median income. E: 50 per cent replacement rate applied to 70 per cent of gross income,
i.e., net replacement rate of 35 per cent. F: D + E combined. Source: Own calculations
based on EUROMOD.
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Table 6: Net contributions (in billion euro) - Di¤erent generosity levels
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
D E F D E F D E F D E F D E F
AT 0.60 0.49 0.42 0.60 0.49 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.32 0.49 0.39 0.34 0.46 0.35 0.32
BE 0.29 0.30 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.10 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.02
CY 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
EE -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
FI -0.29 -0.18 -0.20 -0.24 -0.14 -0.17 -0.27 -0.16 -0.19 -0.27 -0.16 -0.19 -0.26 -0.15 -0.18
FR -1.79 -1.34 -1.25 -1.47 -1.07 -1.03 -2.02 -1.52 -1.41 -1.75 -1.34 -1.22 -1.92 -1.48 -1.34
GE 3.87 3.41 2.71 3.91 3.40 2.74 2.74 1.99 1.92 1.72 1.05 1.20 0.83 0.60 0.58
GR 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.05
IE 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.12
IT 0.10 0.21 0.07 0.77 0.76 0.54 0.65 0.67 0.46 0.66 0.68 0.46 0.05 0.19 0.03
LU 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
LV -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
MT 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
NL 1.66 1.41 1.16 2.00 1.69 1.40 1.95 1.60 1.36 1.68 1.34 1.18 1.44 1.15 1.01
PT 0.30 0.20 0.21 0.30 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.10 0.16 0.12 -0.02 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.11
SI 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
SK -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05
SP -1.16 -0.86 -0.81 -1.14 -0.83 -0.79 -1.66 -1.36 -1.16 -1.94 -1.48 -1.36 -1.88 -1.42 -1.32
EA18 3.72 3.70 2.61 5.16 4.85 3.61 2.40 1.88 1.68 0.96 0.64 0.67 -0.92 -0.59 -0.64
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
D E F D E F D E F D E F D E F
AT 0.39 0.29 0.27 0.49 0.39 0.35 0.59 0.47 0.41 0.71 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.37 0.37
BE -0.00 0.09 -0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.21 0.09 0.17 0.23 0.12 -0.04 0.03 -0.03
CY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
EE 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03
FI -0.15 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.03 -0.22 -0.16 -0.15
FR -1.81 -1.33 -1.27 -1.76 -1.29 -1.23 -1.19 -0.81 -0.83 -1.02 -0.66 -0.72 -2.61 -2.35 -1.82
GE 0.00 -0.10 0.00 1.92 1.95 1.34 4.30 3.86 3.01 5.29 4.61 3.70 3.57 2.95 2.50
GR 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.12 0.15 -0.03 -0.18 -0.02
IE 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.46 -0.63 -0.32
IT 0.30 0.40 0.21 0.91 0.90 0.64 1.29 1.20 0.90 0.88 0.75 0.62 -0.03 -0.10 -0.02
LU 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
LV -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -0.14 -0.08
MT 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
NL 1.53 1.30 1.07 1.96 1.68 1.37 2.29 1.95 1.60 2.50 2.12 1.75 2.12 1.75 1.49
PT 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.11 -0.03 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.10 -0.02 -0.21 -0.01
SI 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.00 0.00
SK -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04
SP -1.61 -1.21 -1.13 -1.41 -1.03 -0.99 -1.45 -1.05 -1.01 -3.81 -3.44 -2.67 -8.47 -7.82 -5.93
EA18 -0.94 -0.48 -0.65 2.69 3.05 1.88 6.62 6.22 4.63 5.29 4.46 3.70 -5.84 -6.58 -4.09
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2010 2011 2012 2013
D E F D E F D E F D E F
AT 0.62 0.50 0.43 0.70 0.56 0.49 0.69 0.55 0.48 0.59 0.44 0.42
BE -0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.16 0.24 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.12 -0.01 -0.08
CY -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08
EE -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
FI -0.20 -0.09 -0.14 -0.15 -0.04 -0.10 -0.14 -0.04 -0.10 -0.22 -0.12 -0.16
FR -2.62 -2.02 -1.83 -2.45 -1.82 -1.71 -3.19 -2.59 -2.23 -3.90 -3.14 -2.73
GE 5.08 4.36 3.55 7.40 6.33 5.18 8.02 6.76 5.62 8.47 7.13 5.93
GR -0.27 -0.45 -0.19 -0.61 -0.83 -0.43 -0.77 -1.01 -0.54 -0.71 -0.81 -0.49
IE -0.40 -0.44 -0.28 -0.28 -0.30 -0.19 -0.25 -0.25 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.12
IT -0.22 -0.14 -0.16 0.03 0.21 0.02 -0.98 -1.16 -0.68 -1.73 -1.58 -1.21
LU 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
LV -0.10 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
MT 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
NL 1.85 1.50 1.30 2.01 1.72 1.41 1.75 1.40 1.22 1.24 0.91 0.86
PT -0.02 -0.20 -0.02 -0.17 -0.33 -0.12 -0.33 -0.54 -0.23 -0.27 -0.43 -0.19
SI 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
SK -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
SP -8.54 -7.13 -5.98 -8.78 -7.25 -6.14 -9.97 -8.50 -6.98 -9.71 -7.98 -6.80
EA18 -4.91 -4.21 -3.44 -2.24 -1.60 -1.57 -5.31 -5.42 -3.72 -6.69 -5.91 -4.68
Notes: Net contributions (SIC - BEN) in billion euro. D, E, F: Baseline coverage of
EMU-UI (no waiting period, all new unemployed covered) D: Maximum benet 50 per cent
of median income. E: 50 per cent replacement rate applied to 70 per cent of gross income,
i.e., net replacement rate of 35 per cent. F: D + E combined. Source: Own calculations
based on EUROMOD.
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Table 7: Income stabilization - Di¤erent coverage scenarios
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 0 0 0 45 30 42 2 1 1 15 3 1 15 3 1
BE 0 0 0 28 16 18 36 25 23 2 1 9 2 1 9
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 17 15 30 25 13 30 25 13
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 0 196 90 192 2 1 1 34 36 1 34 36 1
GE 0 0 0 24 17 22 13 11 10 12 3 3 12 3 3
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 27 10 32 27 10
IE 0 0 0 47 36 21 20 23 17 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 0 0 0 30 21 12 30 20 20 36 21 7 36 21 7
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 325 154 22 325 154 22
MT 53 24 24 0 0 0 55 1 28 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 24 14 11 20 11 9 17 17 8 17 17 8
PT 132 86 1 31 22 15 31 23 13 2 1 16 2 1 16
SI 0 0 0 258 218 164 17 29 30 0 0 0 0 0 0
SK 3 35 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 59 21 65 59 21
SP 0 0 0 41 33 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EA18 4 3 0 55 30 47 7 6 5 15 12 3 15 12 3
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 18 7 0 0 0
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 22 22 2 7 1
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 20 5 15 18 6
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 26 4 21 14 11 2 5 2
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 14 16 2 1 2
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 20 18 2 1 25
GE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 37 60 0 0 0
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 19 13 14 10 7
IE 144 205 23 95 57 34 34 20 13 26 16 13 2 1 1
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 21 3 25 21 7 10 9 4
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 4 21 119 134 16 0 0 0
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 29 4 25 20 9 2 1 1
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 21 13 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 22 20 17 12 8
PT 0 0 0 65 36 22 0 0 0 25 18 21 2 5 1
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 27 20 7 14 1
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 27 9 2 6 2
SP 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 16 13 23 19 14 2 1 1
EA18 2 3 0 3 2 1 12 7 3 36 24 25 4 3 6
41
2011 2012 2013
A B C A B C A B C
AT 0 0 0 69 38 5 28 21 1
BE 0 0 0 51 29 27 20 16 14
CY 34 26 7 20 14 5 10 9 2
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 15 14
FR 0 0 0 37 18 33 31 63 9
GE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GR 12 9 5 4 4 1 2 1 1
IE 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 0 0 18 12 3 9 6 4
LU 56 48 1 35 6 26 33 27 9
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 101 35 53
NL 0 0 0 20 11 9 18 14 7
PT 33 11 1 15 13 8 2 1 1
SI 23 6 10 4 1 1 10 14 1
SK 0 0 0 39 24 10 2 1 1
SP 3 1 1 12 10 7 2 1 1
EA18 2 1 0 18 10 10 11 16 4
Notes: Income stabilization coe¢ cients. A: Baseline, all new unemployed with previous
employment income covered. B: Waiting period, no benets paid in the rst 2 months of
the unemployment spell. C: National coverage, only the share of short-term unemployed
covered by national unemployment insurance systems receives benets. Source: Own
calculations based on EUROMOD.
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Table 8: Income stabilization - Di¤erent generosity levels
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
D E F D E F D E F D E F D E F
AT 0 0 0 44 31 22 1 1 1 3 11 6 3 11 6
BE 0 0 0 23 19 14 29 25 24 3 1 8 3 1 8
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 25 17 21 21 19 21 21 19
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 0 194 137 116 1 1 1 15 24 20 15 24 20
GE 0 0 0 23 17 10 12 9 7 7 8 10 7 8 10
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 22 14 21 22 14
IE 0 0 0 34 33 21 19 14 32 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 0 0 0 21 21 13 25 21 16 21 25 20 21 25 20
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 173 227 170 173 227 170
MT 38 37 30 0 0 0 42 39 31 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 18 17 11 15 14 10 12 12 11 12 12 11
PT 31 92 57 23 22 12 22 22 14 1 1 1 1 1 1
SI 0 0 0 211 181 149 23 12 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
SK 1 2 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 46 38 43 46 38
SP 0 0 0 25 29 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EA18 1 3 2 51 38 30 6 5 4 8 11 10 8 11 10
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
D E F D E F D E F D E F D E F
AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 20 13 0 0 0
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 21 15 1 1 5
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 27 19 10 11 13
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 36 27 16 14 9 1 1 3
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 17 13 1 1 3
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 21 14 7 1 18
GE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 43 31 0 0 0
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 22 13 10 10 6
IE 83 101 72 65 66 48 24 24 15 19 18 11 1 1 1
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 24 16 16 17 13 7 7 9
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 18 11 67 83 76 0 0 0
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 32 20 17 18 10 1 1 1
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 14 9 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 25 18 13 12 10
PT 0 0 0 44 46 28 0 0 0 23 17 9 1 1 2
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 29 20 4 5 4
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 27 21 2 1 1
SP 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 23 16 19 16 12 1 1 1
EA18 1 1 1 2 2 2 7 8 6 31 25 18 4 3 6
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2011 2012 2013
D E F D E F D E F
AT 0 0 0 37 49 37 14 20 13
BE 0 0 0 39 36 28 17 14 11
CY 21 24 19 12 14 9 6 7 6
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 19 14
FR 0 0 0 35 26 18 20 22 19
GE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GR 8 8 5 3 3 2 1 1 1
IE 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 0 0 11 13 7 7 6 7
LU 23 39 28 30 24 18 21 23 17
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 71 60
NL 0 0 0 14 14 9 12 12 9
PT 14 23 17 12 11 6 1 1 1
SI 16 16 16 1 3 4 5 7 4
SK 0 0 0 25 27 21 1 1 1
SP 1 2 3 10 9 6 1 1 1
EA18 1 2 1 14 13 9 7 8 7
Notes: Income stabilization coe¢ cients. D, E, F: Baseline coverage of EMU-UI (no waiting
period, all new unemployed covered) D: Maximum benet 50 per cent of median income. E:
50 per cent replacement rate applied to 70 per cent of gross income, i.e., net replacement
rate of 35 per cent. F: D + E combined. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
44
Table 9: Trigger for contingent benets
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii
AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CY 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
EE 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
GR 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SK 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii
AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
GE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IE 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
LV 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
PT 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
SP 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: Years in which contingent benets are activated. Contingent scheme i): Benets are paid if unemployment rate
in a given member state in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than in t-1 (one-year look-back period).
Contingent scheme ii): 2-year look-back period, i.e., benets are triggered if unemployment rate in year t is at least 1
percentage point higher than in t-1 OR t-2. Contingent scheme iii): 3-year look-back period, i.e., benets are triggered
if unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than in t-1 OR t-2 OR t-3. Source: AMECO.
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